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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EBEN BLOMQUIST, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 15496 
J. DAL PETERSON and KARL D. 
BLOMQUIST and MINERALS 
RECOVERY COMPANY, aka MINERAL 
RECOVERY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for the collection of a prom-
issory note. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable David B. Dee, denied plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment and granted the motion for sum-
mary judgment of defendant Minerals Recovery Corporation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Minerals Recovery Corporation prays the 
judgment be affirmed, and that it be awarded its costs on 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 11, 1974, a promissory note in the amount 
of $10,222 was executed by Eben Blomquist, plaintiff, and by 
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two of the individual defendants, Karl D. Blomquist and 
J. Dal Peterson. The promissory note did not indicate that 
it was secured by any collateral; there was no reference to 
the mining equipment which is the subject of this appeal. 
In fact, only the following notation appeared at the bottom 
of the document: "This note is secured by a Security Agree-
ment of even date." (R.48,75.) Notwithstanding the nota-
tion on the promissory note, the plaintiff and the individual 
defendants did not execute a formal, written security agree-
ment pursuant to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, §§70A-9-101, 
et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953). (R. 46-48; 88.) 
Subsequent to the execution of the promissory 
note, the plaintiff and the two individual defendants exe-
cuted a financing statement and filed it with the Secretary 
of State of Utah on August 7, 1974. (R.48; 73-74.) The 
document is a standard form UCC-1 financing statement; this 
fact is evidenced by the notation at the bottom of the 
statement itself (R.48; 74), and is admitted by plaintiff. 
(R.88.) The financing statement does not refer to a secu-
rity interest in any property, nor does it even refer to the 
promissory note between the parties. 
The maturity date of the promissory note was Sep-
tember 1, 1974 (R.48; 75), and evidently, according to 
plaintiff, the principal amount was never paid. Accordingly, 
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on August 27, 1976, plaintiff brought an action in the Third 
Judicial District Court against the two individual defen-
dants in order to collect the principal of the promissory 
note. The complaint also alleged that payment of the note 
was secured by a piece of mining equipment, a "belt tank." 
Since the mining equipment was in the possession of Minerals 
Recovery Corporation (herein "MRC") at the time the original 
complaint was filed, MRC was listed as a defendant, too. 
(R. 2-5.) 
On October 13, 1976, plaintiff and one of the 
individual defendants, Karl D. Blomquist, stipulated that 
the mining equipment could. be sold and that the proceeds 
from the sale could be applied against the outstanding 
balance of the promissory note. (R.69.) Then, on Febru-
ary 9, 1977, plaintiff obtained a default judgment on the 
promissory note against the other individual defendant, 
J. Dal Peterson. (R. 39-41.) 
On June 9, 1977, plaintiff filed a motion for 
summary judgment against MRC, contending that the promissory 
note was secured by the mining equipment in the possession 
of MRC. (R.67.) On July 11, 1977, MRC filed its own motion 
for summary judgment. (R.86.) MRC contended that the 
security interest alleged by plaintiff was not enforceable 
against it since the plaintiff and the two individual defen-
dants had not executed a valid security agreement, pursuant 
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to the requirements of §70A-9-203 of the Utah Uniform Com-
mercial Code, covering the promissory note and the mining 
equipment. (R. 22.) 
Both motions were heard on July 14, 1977. (R. 95.) 
On September 30, 1977, the court, the Honorable David B. Dee 
presiding, entered its order, denying the plaintiff's motion 
for swmnary judgment and granting the swmnary judgment 
motion of MRC. (R.112-113.) The court held in its accom-
panying Memorandum Decision that: 
• . . a reading of 70-A-9-203 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) does not allow the crea-
tion of a security agreement under th~ 
facts in this case taking the Promissory 
Note and Financing Statement together 
with and reading them in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff and therefore 
the plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judg-
ment is denied and the defendant Mineral 
Recovery Company's Motion For Summary 
Judgment is granted. (R.124.) 
The plaintiff appeals from that decision. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
The plaintiff contends he has a valid and enforce-
able security interest in the mining equipment currently 
possessed by MRC. He has based this assertion on the ra-
tionale that the promissory note and the financing statement 
between himself and the two individual defendants meet the 
requirements of a written security agreement under §§70A-9-20l, 
-204, Utah Code Ann. (1953). In order to determine whether 
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the parties have properly created a security agreement in 
the course of their transactions, and thereby obtained a 
security interest in the mining equipment, attention must 
first be directed to the specific requirements of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code itself·. 
A security agreement is an agreement which creates 
and provides for a security interest,* and a security inter-
est is an interest in personal property which secures pay-
ment on performance of an obligation.** Section 70A-9-203(1), 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), specifies the requisites for the 
enforceability of a security interest; it provides in perti-
nent part: 
Subject to the provisions of section 
70A-9-208 on the security interest of a 
collecting bank and section 70A-9-113 on 
a security interest arising under the chap-
ter on sales, a security interest is not 
enforceable against the debtor or third 
parties unless 
(a) the collateral is in the 
possession of the secured party; or 
(b) the debtor has signed a 
security agreement which contains a 
description of the collateral • • 
{Emphasis added.) 
*Section 70A-9-105 (1) (h), Utah Code Ann. (1953) · 
**Section 70A-l-201(37), Utah Code Anno. (1953). 
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In addition, §70A-9-204(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953), specifies 
the requisities for the attachment of a security interest; 
it provides: 
A security interest cannot attach 
until there is agreement (subsection (3) 
of section 70A-l-201) that it attach and 
value is given and the debtor has rights 
in the collateral. It attaches as soon 
as all of the events in the preceding sen-
tence have taken place unless explicit 
agreement postpones the time of attaching. 
The above two provisions, §70A-9-203 and §70A-9-204, incor-
porate four general requirements for the creation and en-
forcement against third parties of a valid security interest: 
(1) The debtor must acquire rights in the col-
lateral; 
(2) The secured party must give value; 
(3) There must be an agreement specifically 
creating or providing for a security interest in parti-
cular property; and 
(4) The debtor must have signed a security agree-
ment containing a description of the collateral; or the 
secured party must acquire possession of the collateral. 
The first two requirements do not have particular importance 
in this lawsuit. We are primarily concerned with the last 
two, since they are responsible for the general imposition 
on contracting parties of a formal, written security agree-
ment. And, there must be a binding security agreement in 
I 
_.... 
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order to make the security interest enforceable against 
innocent third parties. 
It has always been conceded by plaintiff that a 
formal, written security agreement was never executed by 
himself and the two individual defendants. (R.46-48; 88.) 
It is his contention, however, that courts in other juris-
dictions have recognized "substitutes" to such formal secu-
rity agreements. The present inquiry is, therefore, which 
combination of papers, documents or agreements can qualify 
under the foregoing provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code to create an enforceable security agreement against 
third parties. Defendant contends that neither of the two 
documents before the Court, individually or taken together, 
constitutes an adequate security agreement which created or 
provided for a security interest in the mining equipment. 
Plaintiff's Promissory Note and the Financing Statement 
Do Not Create an Enforceable Security Agreement 
Against Defendant MRC 
A. A Financing Statement May Not Be Enforced as a 
Security Agreement. 
When considering whether the financing statement 
prepared by the parties was to serve as a security agree-
ment, first note that the financing statement was a standard 
form. This observation is borne out by the notation at the 
bottom of the financing statement (R.48; 74), and it has 
been admitted by the plaintiff, too. (R.88.) The over-
whelming general rule is that the Uniform Commercial Code 
j 
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makes no provision for a naked, standard form financing 
statement to be enforced as a security agreement. See, Mid-
Eastern Electronics, Inc. v. First National Bank of Southern 
Maryland, 380 F.2d 355 (_4th Cir. 1967); General Electric Credit. 
Corp. v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 244 Ark. 984, 429 S.W.2d 
60 (1968); M. Rutkin Elec. Supply Co. v. Burdette Elec., Inc .. 
98 N.J.Super. 378, 237 A.2d 500 (1967); Cain v. Country Club 
Delicatessen, 25 Conn.Supp. 327, 203 A.2d 441 (1964); American 
Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963). 
The reasoning underlying this position was aptly 
expressed in Needle v. Lasco Industries, Inc., 10 Cal.App.2d 
1105, 89 Cal.Rptr. 593 (1970). In that case, a retailer was 
being supplied with merchandise for sale on a consignment 
basis to its customers by a wholesaler. The retailer sold 
some of the merchandise without paying the wholesaler, 
whereupon the latter ceased to provide any more merchandise. 
Later, a representative of the wholesaler met with the 
president of the retailer to discuss the delinquest account. 
The wholesaler offered to deliver additional merchandise 
provided the retailer would furnish security in the form of 
its inventory and accounts receivable. The retailer agreed 
to do so, and the wholesaler filled in the blanks of a 
document entitled "Financing Statement." The document was 
executed on behalf of the retailer by its president and vice 
president, and on behalf of the wholesaler by its secretary. 
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It was thereafter filed in the office of the secretary of 
state. 
The wholesaler resumed supplying merchandise to 
the retailer. The retailer's business continued to be poor, 
and eventually the retailer was forced to make a general 
assignment to the plaintiff, a third party, in the approxi-
mate amount of $6,000 for the benefit of its creditors. At 
that same time, the retailer owed the wholesaler approxi-
mately $4,600; accordingly, the wholesaler claimed that it 
was entitled to the entire amount due to it, on the basis 
that it was a preferred creditor under the financing state-
ment. The plaintiff brought an action for declaratory 
relief against the wholesaler, putting in issue only one 
matter pertinent here: Whether the financing statement 
constituted an enforceable security agreement. 
The trial court concluded that the financing 
statement was a valid security agreement, and the plaintiff 
appealed. The California Court of Appeals reversed, basing 
its reversal on two considerations. First, the financing 
statement failed to express any evidence of an agreement by 
the debtor to grant the claimants a security interest in 
specific collateral. Second, although the financing state-
ment described the collateral, there was no indication of 
the underlying obligation for which the collateral was secu-
rity. For all that appeared from the writing, the obliga-
tion secured may have been a loan from the wholesaler to the 
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retailer which was subsequently repaid and might not have 
encompassed the retailer's obligation to the wholesaler for 
merchandise delivered. A security interest is collateral 
which secures payment or performance of an obligation, and 
the security agreement is effective only according to its 
terms between the parties and against third parties. At a 
minimum, therefore, the terms must recite the obligation 
secured. The court suggested that the appropriate language 
was a grant of a security interest "to secure the perfor-
mance of the obligation set out in paragraph l," i.e., a 
paragraph in the agreement which fully sets out the obliga-
tion. 
Plaintiff in the instant case must agree with the 
foregoing reasoning, for in his trial memorandum he stated: 
The financing statement of the instant case 
contains no language specifically granting 
a security interest, nor are any of the 
terms of the agreement specified. It is 
arguable that the statement does not con-
tain language sufficient to evidence the 
requisite intent to grant a security inter-
est. (R. 91.) 
It should be borne in mind that a financing state· 
ment and a security agreement serve entirely different func-
tions. The security agreement embodies the entire obliga-
tions, responsibilities and arrangements between the parties. 
The filing of a financing statement, on the other hand, is 
" ... but ... a single step in the means by which the 
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rights and priorities of a secured party are 'perfected'." 
Mid-Eastern Electronics, supra, 380 F.2d at 356. It is 
simply a notice that the party who has filed it may have a 
security interest in the collateral which the statement 
describes. Therefore, 
.. it is clear that the rights of a 
third person do not depend upon whether 
he has examined any financing statement. 
If the [creditor) and [debtor) had exe-
cuted a security agreement but had not 
filed a financing statement, the security 
agreement would not make the [creditor) 
a preferred creditor even though none 
of the other creditors bothered to ascer-
tain whether a financing statement had 
been filed . . . The necessary corollary 
of this proposition is that a financing 
statement filed with respect to a security 
agreement which never comes into existence 
is a nullity. Needle v. Lasco Industries, 
Inc., Cal.App.2d 1105, 1108, 89 Cal.Rptr. 
593, 596 (1970). (Emphasis added.) 
B. A Promissory Note May Not Be Enforced as a Secu-
rity Agreement. 
Similar to the naked financing statement, a prom-
issory note cannot substitute for a valid and enforceable 
security agreement since it does not usually contain "granting" 
language. This issue was adequately addressed by an opinion 
from New Jersey, First County National Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Canna, 124 N.J.Super. 154, 305 A.2d 442 (App.Div. 1973). In 
that case, the court had before it both a homemade promis-
sory note which stated that the loan was for the purchase of 
an automobile, and the automobile certificate of title on 
lll 
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which appeared a notation that the lender was a secured 
party. The latter notation was required in order to perfect 
the lender's security interest. There was no document 
formally entitled "security agreement." The court was asked 
to construe the documents before it as constituting a secu-
rity interest under the New Jersey Commercial Code. In 
holding that they could not be so interpreted, the court 
stated: 
By its very nature an agreement creating 
a security interest in collateral, of 
necessity, must contain language that 
grants or creates a security interest in 
the collateral. In short, the language 
must be such as to clearly indicate that 
the debtor intended to thereby specifically 
grant to the creditor a security interest 
in the collateral. Absent such language 
the writing does not constitute a security 
interest. 305 A.2d at 446. 
Accordingly, the court held that a promissory note which 
does not contain language granting a security interest in 
collateral, even where it recites the data relating to 
collateral as security, is not thereby converted into a 
security agreement. The decision in Canna was based on the 
absence of language in any of the documents which granted a 
security interest. The court implied that if there were 
such granting language in a promissory note or elsewhere, it 
would have found a valid security agreement. 
In the instant case, neither the promissory note 
nor the financing statement contain language, as required by 
I 
__.... 
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~' to grant a security interest in the mining equipment. 
The promissory note does not refer to any collateral, nor 
mention the grant of a security interest; it only recites 
that it is secured by a security agreement of even date. 
Moreover, the financing statement only recites that "this 
financing statement covers the following types (or items) of 
property:", and then the statement refers to the mining 
equipment. Neither instrument clearly shows that the debtor 
intended to grant a security interest and, therefore, neither 
document can be held to grant a security interest to the 
plaintiff. 
c. The Promissory Note and Financing Statement, Taken 
Together, May Not Be Enforced as a Security Agree-
ment. 
As in other contract settings involving a statute 
of frauds requirement, two or more writings can often be 
incorporated to satisfy the written security agreement 
requirement under §70A-9-203 and §70A-9-204. Similar to a 
financing statement or a promissory note, the determining 
factor is whether the multiple documents, taken together, 
clearly reveal a specific grant by the debtor of a security 
interest in the collateral. 
An illustrative case is In re Carmichael Enter-
prises, Inc., 9 U.C.C.Rep. 990 (N.D.Ga. 1971). There, the 
court determined that a financing statement sufficed as a 
valid security agreement since it was attended by numerous 
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other documents. For example, the creditor offered in 
evidence a letter from its assistant credit manager to the 
vice president of the debtor corporation. The letter stated, 
in part: 
In accordance with our several phone con-
versations, the following will outline our 
requirements which will enable us to ex-
tend additional time on the payment of 
·your indebtedness to us. Our arrangement 
will be formalized by a loan agreement con-
taining the following provisions: 
* * * 
5. Execution of a Financing 
Statement in which accounts receiv-
able inventory and proceeds thereof 
are provided as collateral for the 
above indebtedness. 
In addition, the creditor offered to the court another 
letter and financing statement which were subsequently sent 
to the debtor corporation. The letter set forth the terms 
of the loan agreement and recited that in consideration for 
the creditor's acceptance of the debtor's notes to cover its 
debt, the debtor must agree to execute and return the en-
closed standard form financing statement. The second letter 
was, in turn, signed on behalf of the debtor corporation by 
its vice president, bearing the date of his signature and 
the notation: "Agreed." The financing statement, enclosed 
in the letter, was also signed on behalf of the debtor 
corporation by its vice president. On the basis of this 
extensive documentation, the court held that the creditor 
obtained a security agreement from the debtor. 
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A similar result was expressed in In re Truckers 
International, Inc., Sage v. City of Mount Vernon, 17 U.C.C.Rep. 
1337 (W.D.Wash. 1975). In that case a bankrupt truck dealer 
had not signed a document officially designated as a secu-
rity agreement with a truck manufacturer. Nevertheless, 
the combination of the following multiple documents executed 
between the parties required the conclusion by the court 
that a security agreement, sufficient under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, had been executed: A dealership agreement, 
a financing statement, a signatory authorization (under 
which specified representatives of the manufacturer were 
appointed agents for the dealer and were permitted to exe-
cute notes and security instruments on behalf of the dealer 
and in favor of the manufacturer), and a dealer note. It 
was the court's conclusion that, taken as a whole, the pre-
ceding documentation contemplated and provided for secured 
credit transactions between the parties. 
A similar result was reached in the opinion of 
In re Munroe Builders, Inc., 20 u.c.c.Rep. 739 (W.D.Mich. 
1976). There, the defendant had entered into a written 
contract with a municipality for the construction of a ski 
resort building. In order to obtain the necessary construc-
tion proceeds, the defendant executed four promissory notes 
with a bank. The notes contained various descriptions of 
security. The first bore the notation: "Chocolay Township 
Warming House"; the second bore the notation: "Chocolay 
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Township Warming House"; the third bore the notation: 
"Secured by check assignment"; and the fourth bore no de-
scription of security. Later, in a letter to the supervisor 
of the municipality, the defendant wrote the following: 
••. I, the undersigned, president 
of Munroe Builders, Inc., hereby request 
and authorize you to send all the money 
due this complany (sic} upon completion 
of the warming house project to the Peoples 
State Bank of Munising to be credited to 
my account for payment of the construction 
loan granted to us for construction of sub-
ject project. 
This authorization is voluntarily 
given to procure construction funds for 
the above project and it is irrevocable. 
20 U.C.C.Rep., at 740. 
The municipal supervisor, in turn, wrote the bank that the 
"assignment" was accepted subject to the rights of the 
municipality. There was no filing of a financing statement 
by either party, the defendant corporation or the bank. On 
this basis, the court concluded that the four promissory 
notes and the two letters, taken together, satisfied the 
requirements for a valid, written security agreement between 
the parties. See also, Morey Machinery Co., Inc. v. Great 
Western Industrial Machinery Co., 16 U.C.C.Rep. 489 (5th 
Cir. 1975). 
It is absolutely essential to observe that the 
foregoing cases require the multiple documents to evidence 
the specific intent of the debtor to grant a security inter-
est in particular property to the creditor. Those multiple 
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documents which satisfy this requirement typically involve 
more significant and detailed documents, and a greater 
number, than are involved in the instant case. Even the 
opinions cited by the plaintiff in his appeal brief evidence 
this conclusion. (Brief of Appellant, at 7-8.) For instance, 
In re Arnex-Protein Development Corp., 504 F.2d 1056 (9th 
Cir. 1974), a promissory note, a financing statement and 
several invoices; In re Numeric Corp., 485 F.2d 1328 (1st 
Cir. 1973), a financing statement, a resolution of the cor-
porate directors of the debtor establishing that an agree-
ment in fact existed to give the secured party a security 
interest, and an itemization of the collateral; In re Penn 
Housing, 367 F.Supp. 661 {W.D.Pa. 1973), a financing state-
ment, eleven promissory notes, an acknowledgment of the debt 
by a letter which also pledged security, and an extensive 
course of dealing between the parties; In re Matronics, 
Inc., 2 u.c.C.Rep. 364 {D.Conn. 1964), a financing state-
ment, a promissory note, and a loan agreement. 
There are, of course, numerous cases in which the 
courts have concluded that the parties failed to create a 
valid and enforceable security agreement, notwithstanding 
the existence of multiple documents between them. See, 
e.g., Crete State Bank, Crete, Nebraska, v. Lauhoff Grain 
Co., 195 Neb. 605, 239 N.W.2d 789 (1976); Land v Co. v. 
Asch, 267 Md. 251, 297 A.2d 285 (1972). There are two such 
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opinions which are strikingly similar to the instant case. 
Both involved a promissory note and a financing statement, 
and in each case the court concluded that the parties had 
not created a valid and enforceable security agreement 
between themselves. The first is Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical 
Sales, Inc. v. Hurst, 176 N.W.2d 166 (Iowa, 1970). In that 
case the plaintiff sold farm supplies to the defendant, and 
the defendant executed a promissory note in payment of the 
account. The note contained the following handwritten 
notation: "This note covered by security agreement dated 
March 9, '67." Thereafter, a financing statement was exe-
cuted by the plaintiff and defendant and appropriately 
filed. No formal security agreement was signed, either then 
or later. 
Sometime later, the defendant sold his farm pro-
duce to third parties and neglected to pay his note. Ac-
cordingly, the plaintiff started an action to collect the 
amount due it, relying upon the claim that the execution of 
the promissory note and the financing statement, together 
with the filing of the latter document, created a security 
interest in the farm produce. In its opinion the court 
provided the following discussion: 
The cases uniformly hold that a financing 
statement does not ordinarily create a 
security interest. It merely gives notice 
that one is or may be claimed. The same 
authorities hold a financing statement 
may double as a security agreement if it 
contains appropriate language which grants I I 
I 
I 
..... 
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a security interest. The financing state-
ment now before us contains no language 
which can be interpreted as granting such 
an interest. 
It is apparent a financing statement 
was not intended under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code to serve as a security agreement. 
Section 554.9402, Code of Iowa, provides 
in part: 
(1) A financing statement is 
sufficient if it is signed by the 
debtor and the secured party, gives 
an address of the secured party from 
which information concerning the 
security may be obtained, gives a 
mailing address of the debtor and 
contains a statement indicating the 
types, or describing the items, of 
collateral. A financing statement 
may be filed before a security agree-
ment is made or a security interest 
otherwise attaches ..•. 
Quite obviously, if the security interest 
may come into existence after the financing 
statement is filed, such---stat'ement does 
not create the lien. 
We hold that the financing statement 
signed by the parties and filed with the 
recorder . . . afforded plaintiff no secu-
rity interest in the [farm produce] sold 
by defendant • . . . (All emphasis the 
court's.) 7 U.C.C.Rep. at 732. 
The second opinion is Barth Brothers v. Billings, 
68 Wis.2d 80, 227 N.W.2d 673 (1975). In that case two 
separate parties both made claims against the defendant. 
One of the plaintiffs based its claim on four promissory 
notes signed by the defendant. All four notes contained a 
notation which basically provided that each of them was 
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secured by a financing statement filed with tle local regis-
trar of deeds. Financing statements for three of the notes 
were appropriately filed within ten days of the notes being 
signed. The plaintiff claimed that it had a security inter-
est in the defendant's property based on the notes signed by 
the defendant with the notation that they were secured by 
filed financing statements. 
The court disagreed, holding that there is no 
valid security interest where the debtor executes a prom-
issory note and signs a financing statement, but does not 
sign a security agreement. The court accepted the reasoning 
of the majority of the courts that a financing statement may 
double as a security agreement only if it contains appro-
priate language which grants a security interest. No secu-
rity interest existed in the case because the financing 
statements did not contain any language granting such an 
interest. 
The two documents in the instant matter are simi-
lar to those in Kaiser and Barth Brothers. The promissory 
note does not refer to collateral or to a security interest. 
Rather, the note's only significant notation is that it was 
allegedly "secured by a security agreement of even date." 
Of course the security agreement to which the note refers 
never existed, either then or now. The only additional 
document which the parties executed was the financing state-
ment. And it, too, is barren of language sufficient to 
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justify the conclusion that through it the plaintiff ob-
tained a security interest in the mining equipment. These 
documents, together or separately, are not the equivalent of 
a formal security agreement as required by the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
The main opinion on which the plaintiff relies is 
In re Center Auto Parts, 6 U.C.C.Rep. 398 (C.D.Calif. 1968). 
(Brief of Appellant, at pp.10-15.) In Auto Parts, a prom-
issory note and a financing statement were held to consti-
tute a security agreement. The crucial factors relied upon 
by the court were the contemporaneous signing of both docu-
ments by the debtor and the following language in the prom-
issory note: "This note is secured by a certain financing 
statement." The opinion is inapplicable in the instant 
matter for at least two reasons. First, it represents a 
minority view. In fact, an opinion cited by the plaintiff 
in his own appeal brief wholly rejected it. (Brief of 
Appellant, at pp.9, 13.) In Evans v. Everett, 10 N.C.App. 
435, 179 s.E.2d 120 (1971), the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals provided the following comment on the Auto Parts 
opinion: 
In Center, the federal trial court, re-
viewing a decision of a referee in bank-
ruptcy held those words to be sufficient 
to create or provide for a security inter-
est. A description of the collateral 
was provided by the financing statement, 
which, it was stipulated, was the only 
one between the parties. Even if it 
were stipulated that the note and the 
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two financing statements in the present 
case were the only ones between the 
parties. we do not regard the words, 
"This note is secured by Uniform Com-
mercial Code financing statement of 
North Carolina" is a sufficient grant 
of a security interest, and therefore 
do not consider the reasoning in that 
case persuasive. 8 U.C.C.Rep. at 1367. 
Second, the crucial language in the Auto Parts opinion 
(i.e., "this note is secured by a certain financing state-
ment"), is different from that in the instant matter (i.e., 
"this promissory note is secured by a security agreement of 
even date"). In Auto Parts, the promissory note might have 
led an inquirer to the written document which the parties 
intended all to see, namely, the financing statement. Thus, 
by looking to the financing statement, the property provided 
by the debtor as security for the loan was identified. In 
the instant case, any inquirer who had read the promissory 
note would have looked in vain for the security agreement to 
which it refers. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither of the two documents before the Court, 
individually or taken together, constitute an adequate 
security agreement under the relevant provisions of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code. The plaintiff did not obtain a 
security interest in the mining equipment possessed by MRC. 
The summary Judgment should be affirmed and defen-
dant should be awarded its costs on appeal. 
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DATED this 17th day of February, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
By l '-'"'--'---. VV"l~ 
---~~J~o~hn w. Horsley I 
600 Deseret Plaza Buildin 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411I 
Attorneys for Defendant-Re ondent 
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